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MINNESOTA

LAW REVIEW
VOL. II

DECEMBER, 1917

No. 1

THE CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUE IN MINIMUM-WAGE
LEGISLATION
IN the MIxA1so0TA LAw R~viEw for June,' Mr. Rome G.
Brown argues against the economic wisdom and the constitutional validity of minimum-wage legislation. He recognizes
rightly that the question is still an open one so far as the interpretation of the federal constitution is concerned, since the
Supreme Court establishes no precedent by affirming by a four
to four vote the judgment of the state court in the Oregon
Minimum Wage cases. His surmise as to the division of
opinion among the members of the bench seems to be well
founded.
"It seems evident," he says, "that in the final
decision Justices McKenna, Holmes, Day and Clarke favored
affirmance [of the Oregon decision sustaining the statute]
with Chief Justice White, and Justices Van Devanter. Pitney
and McReynold$ for reversal." Mr. Brown's allocation of the
judges coincides approximately with the division in earlier
cases when the questions in issue involved legislative interference with freedom of contract for personal service. 2 Such
division indicates the extent to which the solution of consti-.
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During the last term of the Supreme Court, Justices White, Van
Devanter, and McReynolds dissented in cases sustaining the Washington
Compulsory Insurance Act, Mountain Timber Co. v. Washington,
(1917) 243 U.S. 219, 37 S. C. R. 260, and the Oregon" ten-hour law,
2
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tutional issues is affected by the general mental outlook of
the judges.
This is of course natural in the interpretation of such a
clause as the one providing that no person shall be deprived
of liberty or property without due process of law. The clause
itself sheds no light on the crucial question of what is and
what is not due process. It indicates that statutes depriving
any one- of liberty must pass some test to be constitutional,
but the test is left entirely without definition.. Nor has the
Supreme Court given us any definition which defines. It has
said that interference with liberty or property must be reasonable and not arbitrary. But-there is as ample room for disagreement as to what is reasonable and what is arbitrary as
there is as to what is due process of law. Such vague phrases
lend themselves naturally to the conscious or unconscious preconceptions of the persons who use them.
This appears to have happened in a measure to Mr. Brown.
His concluding paragraph seems more appropriate to the
hustings than to a legal article.
"This sort of legislation is a new expression of the paternalistic and socialistic tendencies of the day. It savors of the
division of property between those who have and those who
have not, and the leveling of fortunes by division under governmental supervision. It is consistent with the orthodox
socialist creed, but it is not consistent with the principles of
our government which are based upon the protection of individual rights. After long study and discussion of the subject,
Bunting v. Oregon

(1917) 243 U. S. 426, 37 S. C. R. 435. They were

with the majority in declaring unconstitutional a statute forbidding

employment agencies from accepting fees from employees. Adams v.
Tanner, (1917) 37 S. C. R. 662. Justice Iolmes and Clarke took the
opposite position in' all three cases and also voted to sustain the
Adamson Law, Wilson v. New, (1917) 243 U. S. 332, 37 S. C. R. 298.
Mr. Justice McKenna differed from Justices Holmes and Clarke only
in the decision involving the Washington Compulsory Insurance Act.
Justices Pitney and Day agreed with Justices Holmes ard Clarke with
respect to compulsory insurance and the ten-hour day and differed
from them in respect to the Adamson Law and the employment agency
case. Though Chief Justice White voted to sustain the Adamson
Law his opinion -indicated clearly his opposition, to statutory wagefixing in general. This is also true of the opinion of Mr. Justice Pitney
in that case. Hence it seems almost certain that Justices White,. Van
Devanter, Pitney and McReynolds would regard minimum-wage legislation as unconstitutional. In addition to the fact that this would
necessitate placing Justices Day and McKenna among the four who
upheld the Oregon minimum-wage statute, there is little if anything
in their opinions on the Adamson Law to induce the contrary inference. See 65 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 607.
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such legislation still seems to the writer to be a long step
toward nullifying our constitutional guaranties."
It may be doubted whether fortunes will be greatly leveled
as a result of the administration of a statute which compels
employers to pay normal employees at least $8.64 a week. It
may be doubted whether such a statute is more paternalistic
than one providing for compulsory education or compulsory
military service. The statute does not go far towards compulsory division of property when all it does is to say to an
employer: "If you choose to seek profit from the labor of a
woman, you must pay that woman what it costs to keep her
in condition to furnish that labor. If it is not to your advantage to pay for labor what it costs to produce it, you need
not employ the labor." Such a statute prevents an employer
from taking advantage of the support furnished his employee
by others than himself. It prevents a division of property
which has been taking place in his favor by reason of his
superior bargaining power. It puts the burden of meeting
the cost of producing the labor on the one who voluntarily
seeks to enjoy the fruits of the labor. These observations
too are perhaps more appropriate to the hustings than to a
legal article. They plead the excuse of the homeopathic
pharmacopeia and they claim the merit of approaching more
nearly to the concrete than do the phrases "socialistic tendencies" and "principles of our government."
I
Mr. Brown presents some economic objections to minimum-wage legislation, recognizing however that "they are
not directly pertinent in a discussion of its constitutionality."
The first of these objections is in reality an economic objection
to our federal system of government. The complaint is that
employers in states having minimum-wage statutes will be at
a disadvantage in competing with rivals in other states who
are still free to drive as hard bargains with their employees' as
they can. This cannot be denied. It is equally true of state
legislation relating to hours of labor, requiring safe and sanitary factories and prohibiting the employment of children. If
the objection were to be given weight in determining questions
of constitutionality, it would postpone much of our labor legis-
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lation until all the states were ready to take the same step.
The remedy for the admitted evil is plain. Congress has
already adopted it with respect to the employment of child
labor. In the exercise of its power over interstate commerce
it has closed the channels of such commerce to the manufacturers who employ children below the designated age. This
gives to those who do not employ children the whole of the
market fed by interstate transportation. Similar action may
be appropriate with respect to employers who pay .wages
less than the cost of subsistence.
The other economic objections referred to are that the
minimum wage will tend to become the maximum wage and
that the statutory raising of wages will reduce the number of
jobs. Underlying the argument in support of these two objections is the assumption that the value of the contribution
of each laborer is susceptible of precise determination. Thus
Mr. Brown says:
"The possible wage cost of any particular industry is limited.
If a sum which is more than the work-worth of the less efficient employees is fixed as a minimum wage for them, then
the unavoidable result is holding the more efficient class more
precisely to the limit of their actual worth-work."
This is to say that employers are now paying the more
efficient employees more than they earn. If they have to pay
less efficient employees more than they earn, they will reduce
the wages of the more efficient. It assumes that each individual laborer has a "work-worth," that employers now pay less
efficient employees their work-worth and pay more efficient
employees more than their work-worth. Two results are to
follow the application of minimum-wage legislation. Employers are to dismiss their less efficient employees. Employers
are to retain their less efficient employees at higher wages
and reduce correspondingly the wages of their more efficient
employees
To be saved from inconsistency Mr. Brown must be taken
to mean that some employers will choose one alternative and
the rest choose the other. But it is hard to accept these
dire results to the laborers which Mr. Brown predicts and at
the same time to acquiesce in his complaints that the statutory
minimum wage raises the cost of production and savors of the
division of property between those who have and those who
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have not. The only instance of actual experience which he
adduces is of one brush concern in Massachusetts which discharged one hundred of its unskilled employees, apportioned
the unskilled labor among the skilled employees and reduced
its total wage bill $40,000 a year. 3 Yet "this sort of legislation
is a new expression of the paternalistic and socialistic tendencies of the day." And again: "Each wage, when fixed, is only
a :tepping stone to a higher wage. Each class of employees
:s constantly seeking an increase, regardless of any basis of
cLomputation, and particularly regardless of the worth of the
employee to the employer."
It is nowhere made clear why employers are so philanthropic as to pay any employee more than his "work-worth."
The only answer would seem to be that employers are unable
to compute the "work-worth" of their individual employees.
But Mr. Brown does not adopt this explanation. le assumes
the contrary. not only in his discussion of economic objections
to the legislation, but in his argument against its constitutionality.
II.
The objections to the constitutionality of minimum-wage
legislation are stated under four heads. The first is that it
"fixes a wage based solely upon the individual needs of the
employee-not as a worker, bu't as an individual." Consideration of this objection will be given later. The fourth objection is that "the statute has, therefore, the effect to deprive
both the employer and the employee of their property and of
the liberty of contract." This may be conceded. But it does
not get us far, since the question is whether the deprivation
is with or without (lue process. All of the statutes which have
been sustained as valid exercises of the police power have taken
liberty or property. The constitution does not forbid the taking of liberty and property. It forbids only such takings as
are without lue process of law.
Many instances of a
" I MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW at pp. 474-75.
contrary tenor might have been found by Mr. Brown in the brief submitted to the Supreme Court in support of the Oregon minimumwage statute. Th'is brief has been reprinced by the National ConThe
sumers' League under the title Oregon Minimum Wage Cases.
material referred to was gathered by Miss Josephine Goldmark and
appears on pages 77-763 passim.
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The second objection is that the statute "puts the burden
on the employer to supply those individual needs to the
extent that the money required therefor is in excess of what
the employee earns, or can earn, or is worth." One obvious
answer to this is that it is false. The employer remains entirely free to say to any employee: "You are not worth to me
the statutory minimum wage. Therefore I will not hire you.
I will not be so foolish as to hire you if your labor does not
yield me what the statute says I must pay you." Moreover,
in the Oregon statute which has been sustained, there was a
provision for granting special licenses to those "physically
defective or crippled by age or *otherwise" permitting them to
be employed at a wage less than that found by the commission
to be the cost of living. It is plain that minimum-wage legislation does not compel employers to make any contract that
in their judgment is not remunerative. It may, it is true, disable them from ,making as remunerative contracts as they
might do if left free to bargain to their best advantage. The
legislation is opposed to the theory that there is a constitutionally guaranteed right to make the most advantageous bargains
which one's economic position permits. So is all usury legislation. So is legislation directed against restraint of trade. So
is the recent legislation of Congress relating to the control and
distribution of the food supply.
But the fundamental fallacy in Mr. Brown's second objection is its assumption that each employee has an ascertainable "work-worth." This is not true of the simple case of
a domestic servant. The difficulty is increased when two
labor in co-operation. Mr. Brown's article states that the
argument before the Supreme Court against the Oregon minimum-wage statute was made by "Rome G. Brown. of Minneapolis, and C. W. Fulton, of Portland, Oregon." Their
appeal failed.' How shall we tell the "work-worth" which
each contributed to the result? Still more complicated is
the situation in a large industrial establishment, where land.
buildings, machinery, power, management and labor are all
necessary to the creation of the saleable product. Subtract any
single factor and there is no product to sell. Who will tell
the "work-worth" of each? If profits are unsatisfactory, is it
because the location is bad, because the buildings are ill
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adapted to their purpose, because the machinery is inferior to
that of rivals, because the manager is extravagant or otherwise
incompetent, or because the wage-scale is too high? Is it
because the various factors have not been combined in the
best proportions? Or is it because, in spite of the fact that
all the processes of m.anufacturing have been wisely conducted, the sales force has been stupid, the transportation system
has been faulty, credits have been unwisely extended or the
whims of consumers have veered? Where one man fails, a
rival-may pay twice the wage per capita and succeed. Even
granting that the proportion which labor contributes to the
product could be ascertained, this needs translation into terms,
of money, and in such translation the price received for the
product must be reckoned with. As increase of wages follows
increase of prices, so increase of prices will follow increase of
wages, if the wages paid in rival plants similarly increase and
if the product satisfies a genuine need. If it does not, it is of
public importance that the labor be turned to the creation of
products which do satisfy a real need. This may be hard on
individual manufacturers if they cannot run their business
unless others contribute to the support of their employees.
But an industry or a particular plant which is not economically
self-sustaining can hardly be heard to claim a constitutional
right to secure a labor force which it cannot ration, clothe and
shelter.
This is what is meant by the statement that the employer
who objects to the constitutionality of minimum-wage legislation is claiming a constitutional right to be a parasite. Mr.
Brown seeks to escape this conclusion by insisting that "the
need to any person of a 'living' is. an individual need." "It
exists," he says, "before employment, and during employment,.
and after employment." So it does. But during employment
the need to the employee of a living is likewise a need to theemployer. And the statute deals with the employer only
during the employment. Two persons may have a need of the
same thing. A living for the employee is a need of the
employee, but such living is none the less a need of the employer. One of the requirements of having employees is
that those employees be supported in health. Soieone must
furnish that support if the business is to continue. Support
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of employees is the sine qua non of having them. Yet such
support Mr. Brown regards as outside the "normal" cost of
running the industry.
"What an individual does not earn, so far as necessary to
supply the living wage, must come from outside sources. The
minimum-wage statute says that this difference must be supplied by the one who happens .to have that individual on his
pay-roll; and that such employer cannot make a valid contract
for employment for any less than such fixed minimum. He
must contribute the balance, even if he has to pay it out of
profits. If he cannot pay it out of profits then he must pay it
out of capital. If his business is such that it cannot continue
under such expenditures, beyond those which his business will
allow, or which competition from other states will permit, then
his business must cease. His business has become a 'parasite'
because it cannot finance the normal cost of its existence together with the forced contribution to the individual needs of
its employees which are measured by the minimum wage."
Here again is the assumption that what the low-paid employees now receive is the limit of their "work-worth." And
what they now receive is taken as the "normal" cost of the existence of the business. Yet if the employees were secured
under a r6gime of slavery and not of free contract, the normal
cost of the existence of the business would include the full
and not merely the partial support of the labor force.
Mr. Brown nowhere makes clear why he regards the wages
now received by low-paid employees as the exact measure of
their contribution to the product created jointly by labor and
several other factors. This failure piques our curiosity the
more when we find him taking the position that the wages of
the higher-paid employees are in excess of their contribution,
as he does when he says that ".if a sum which is more than
the work-worth of the less efficient employees is fixed as a
minimum wage for therh, then the unavoidable result is holding the more efficient class more precisely to the limit of their
actual work-worth." If wages measure contribution in one
case, why not in the other ? If the "normal cost" of the business
includes paying the more efficient employees more than their
work is worth, why does it not include the same excess in respect to the less efficient? These mysteries are for those who
insist that there is some method of determining what a woman's work is worth when other factors in the business are as
variable as is the scale of wages. Minimum-wage legislation
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proceeds on no such theory. It prescribes a wage based, as
Mr. Brown recognizes, on the needs of the worker, on what it
costs to keep her a worker. It says that that need is a need
of a business and that the owners of the business shall not by
superior bargaining power impose on others the costs which
are essential to keep the business going. This is not only the
theory of the legislation but it is its result. And from the
standpoint of this theory and this result the question of constitutionality must be determined.
Mr. Brown's third objection to the legislation is that "it
prohibits the employee from making a binding contract for
work at an amount which is measured by efficiency or worth,
and renders jobless those whose efficiency does not come up
to that properly measured by the minimum wage fixed."
Here, in spite of the repetition of his "work-worth" assumption. he stands on somewhat firmer ground. That employers
whose wage rate for low-paid workers is increased will strive
to reduce the number of workers is quite possible. They will be
spurred to conduct their business at its highest possible efficiency. In some instances they may succeed in creating the
same output with a sm'aller force. Where the number of employees r2mains the same. the employer will doubtless be able
to attract laborers of greater efficiency by the higher wage.
\Vith a wider field of choice he will scan the qualifications of
his laborers more closely. And some of the less efficient will
lose their places. Though it is not possible to determine what
portions of the annual excess of income over expenditures are
attributable respectively to capital, to profits and to labor,
though it is not possible to ascertain the share of the joint
product created by each individual laborer, it is certain that
some laborers are more efficient than others. If an employer
pays a wage sufficient to keep the individual employee alive.
he can exercise more discrimination in selecting his employees
than if he pays starvation wages.
Let it be granted, then, that through the operation of the
statutory minimum-wage some employees who are now partially supported by their wages in industrial establishments
will lose their places. Must the legislation fail because of
this? No similar argument prevails to defeat statutes raising
the standards of admission to the bar or to the practice of
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medicine, requiring licenses of locomotive engineers or of
chauffeurs. The public purpose of these statutes differs from
that of the minimum-wage law. But if there be a public purpose in both cases, the fact that resulting injury to the less
efficient is not permitted to defeat the effectuation of that
purpose in one line of cases is warrant for dismissing it as a
controlling consideration in the other line of cases. This is
not to say that it is entitled to no weight whatever. But
against it must be balanced the advantages. It is certainly
going far to insist that there is a constitutional right to the
perpetuation of a labor system which has jobs which take an
employee's entire energies and give in return less than enough
to maintain those energies.
The resulting loss to individual employees from the operation of a minimum-wage law may be compared with that
to would-be borrowers from the operation of usury statutes.
Here the publid purposes are the same, the prevention of
contracts which are deemed coercive and unfair. Some borrowers will fail to get loans as some employees will fail to get
jobs. But it is believed that it is the better public policy not
to have loans made on a basis that is likely to prove ruinous
to the borrower. So is it believed that it is the better public
policy not to have industry conducted on a basis that is likely
to prove ruinous to employees. Those who do not get the
loans and those who do not get the jobs may suffer for a
time more than if they could borrow at usurious interest or
work for less than it costs to live. But against these regrettable results are to be weighed the advantages which come to
those whose loans and jobs are on a basis that the legislature
deems essential to a more general social welfare. Standard
rates of interest for loans, staridard forms of insurance
policies, a standard minimum of wages in certain employments
-these are all indications of a public interest in the terms
of individual bargains which outweighs the interest of individuals to make their bargains on the best or worst terms
which they .can get under unrestricted legal freedom of contract. They indicate the recognition that abstract legal freedom for each individual is deemed less precious than the adoption of general standards dictated by considerations of a wide
social policy.
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The objectors to minimum-wage legislation are riding two
horses which run in opposite directions. They are concerned
that the legislation benefits employees at the expense of employers. They are fearful for the ruin it will bring to employees. They love to choose and see their path so that they
find only the losses and never the countervailing gains. Solicitous for the stray individuals who may be harmed by the
adoption of social standards, they are unmindful of the social
gains from the institution of such standards. They are like
those who would view a conscription law wholly from the
standpoint of the individual who does not wish to be conscripted. However legitimate it may be for them to urge their
point of view before the legislature, it requires more justification to warrant their endeavor to incorporate it into the
constitution of the United States.
III

Though neither the doctrine of individualism nor of laissez
faire is contained in the language of the constitution, they
permeate many judicial opinions interpreting the constitution.
From some of such opinions Mr. Brown quotes. The opinions
were in cases involving statutes excluding aliens from employment4 or forbidding employers to discharge employees
because of their membership in a labor union 5 or to require of
employees as a condition of receiving or remaining in employment an agreement not to become or remain a member of a
labor union.6 These cases are not precedents on the question
whether a minimum wage may be imposed by statute. Indeed
Mr. Brown does not cite them for this purpose. lie is concerned rather with the social philosophy of the judges who
wrote the opinions. And that social philosophy is congenial to
his objections to minimum-wage legislation. But it indicates
nothing more than the personal equation of the particular
judge who wrote the particular opinion. Quotations from
opinions of other judges indicating personal equations of a
4 Truax v. Raich. (1915) 239 U. S. 33, 60 L. Ed. 131, 36 S. C. R. 7,
L. R.A. 1916D 545.
SAdair v. United States, (1908) 208 U.S. 161, 52 L. Ed. 436, 28
S. C. R. 277, 13 Ann. Cas. 764.
6 Coppage v. Kansas, (1914) 236 U. S. 1, 35 S. C. R. 240, L. R. A.
1915C 960.
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contrary tenor may be cited to match those adduced by Mr.
Brown. The situation is familiar to all students of constitutional law. 7 It is not to be denied that these personal equations are influential factors in the decision of constitutional
questions. They may explain the diversities of judicial opinion which are revealed in so many of the important cases. But
they are not the law of the constitution. They do not even
indicate the theory of the Supreme Court as to the social
philosophy which should govern the interpretation of the constitution. For with respect to this social philosophy there
is division of opinion among the members of the Supreme
Court. If we are to deal with problems of constitutionality as
problems of law rather than of judicial psychology we must
disregard judicial utterances of general social views and fix
our attention on judicial sanction or disapproval of particular
social expedients.
Mr. Brown cites no cases decided by the Supreme Court*
which are authority against the validity of minimum-wage
legislation. He tells us that "on principle and on authority the
minimum wage statute seems clearly to extend the power of
regulation beyond the limits held to be prohibited by the
federal constitution." But his only support for this conclusion
is the opinions in the cases referred to in the foregoing paragraph and the dissenting opinion in a case holding that it is not
a denial of due process to regulate the rates of insurance companies. s These are not precedents on the question in issue.
They are at best data from which to infer how individual members of the Supreme Court will inclineto view minimum-wage
legislatioii. But of this we have better evidence than the social
philosophizing in opinions several years old. We have the
fact that one member of the present bench had gratuitously
devoted much of his time during the last few years of his career
at the bar to advocating the constitutionality of this legislation,
7 See Freund. Standards of American
Legislation 185-214, 220.
Compare also, Pound, Liberty of Contract, 18 Yale Law Journal 514;
Corwin', The Doctrine of Due Process of Law Before the Civil War,
24 Harvard Law Review, 366, 460; id. The Supreme Court and the
Fourteenth Amendment, 7 Michigan Law Review 743; and Kales.
Due Process, the Inarticulate Major Premise and the Adamson Act,
26 Yale Law Journal 519.
8 German Alliance Ins. Co. v. Lewis, (1913)
233 U.S. 389, 58 L. Ed.
1011, 34 S.C.R. 612, L.R.A. 1915C 1189.
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and the further fact that the other members of the bench are
divided evenly on the question. We know that so long as the
personnel of the Supreme Court remains unchanged, the only
decisions that will be rendered against such legislation must
be in state tribunals. So that reliance on the individual philosophy of particular Supreme Court judges past or present is
not the sound or safe method of dealing with our problem.

Iv
Mr. Brown makes no inquiry to discover the extent to
which legislatures have already been permitted to deal with
the wage relation. Such inquiry would show that in 1901,
the Supreme Court sustained a state statute requiring employers who issue scrip or store orders in payment of wages to
redeem the same in money when so requested. I Such a statute
has to do with the rate of wages. The situation which it was
passed to remedy is well known. Employees to tide over
the necessities of the moment were glad to accept scrip or
store orders even though it subjected them to exorbitant
prices at the company store. They freely made such binding
contracts, if by "freely" we mean that they chose one of two
theoretically possible alternatives. The statute says that the
contract to accept the store order in lieu of cash shall not be
binding. It may be rescinded at the option of the employee.
One effect of such a statute is to relieve the employee from
the monopoly of the company store and so to increase his real
wages. His scrip or store order is convertible into cash on
the regular pay day. Rival stores may arrange to take the
scrip as security for goods sold by them and count on subsequent redemption in cash. Company stores will have to meet
this competition and so increase the purchasing power of the
scrip and thereby the real wages of employees. The bearing
of this decision on the social philosophy breathed by the
opinions which Mr. Brown quotes is apparent when the de
cision is compared with the denunciatory utterance of tl~e
supreme court of Pennsylvania on similar legislation:
"More than this, it is an insulting attempt to put the
laborer under a legislative tutelage which is not only degrading
" Knoxville Iron Co. v. Harbison; (1901)
55, 22 S. C. R. 1.

183 U. S. 13, 46 L. Ed.
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to his manhood, but subversive of hi: rights as a citizen of the
United States. He may sell his labor for what he thinks best,
whether money or goods, just as his employer may sell his
iron or coal, and any and every law that proposes to prevent
him from so doing is an infringement of his constitutional
privilege and consequently vicious and void." 10
The Supreme Court of the United States with more dignity
and more common sense lakes the opposite position. The decision is not pertinent from the standpoint of an employee who
objects to a minimum-wage statute, but it directly controverts
the contention of the employer that he has a constitutionally
protected right to use his superior economic position to drive
as hard a bargain as he can. It sanctions a statute whose
design and effect was to raise the real wages of employees in
spite of bargains which made every advance payment of wages
conditioned on paying the prices demanded at the company
store-bargains which in orthodox legal theory were freely'
entered into though the freedom was one to delight the metaphysician more than the laborer.
Mr. Brown also neglects a decision of the Supreme Court
handed down in 1909 sustaining a state statute requiring mine
operators to pay miners by "run of mine" weight rather than
by weight after screening. "I This put an end to the system
by which miners received no pay for mining small pieces, although such small pieces had a market value to the mineowners. The result was to raise the wages of -the miners.
provided the rate of payment remained unchanged. It left
the parties free to contract as to the rate, but not as to the
application of the rate to the coal mined. It indicated that the
wage relation was not immune from legislative interference.
Other cases dealing with the wage relation are ones sustaining a statute forbidding the advance payment of wages
to seamen, 12 prohibiting contracts to.pay employees less often
than semi-monthly, 13 and prohibiting the assignment of
wages. 14 These cases all indicate the judicial recognition that
the wage relation may be a matter of public concern, that it is
VI Godcharles v. Wigernan. (1886) 113 Pa. St. 431, 6 Atl. 354.
11 McLean v. Arkansas. (1909) 211 U. S. 539, 29 S. C. R. 206.
12 Patterson v. Bark Eudora, (1903) 190 U. S. 169, 47 L. Ed. 1002.
23 S. C. R. 281.
12 Erie Railroad Co. v. Villiams, (1914) 233 U. S.685. 34 S.C. R. 761.
14 Mutual Loan Co. v. Martell, (1911) 222 U. S.225, 32 S.C. R. 74.
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a legitimate subject of legislative regulation and that the
particular legislative regulation will be sustained if it is warranted by the public interest. They do not, it is true, involve
judicial sanction of the particular public interest involved in
the prescription of a minimum wage. But they utterly refute
the notion that it is constitutionally impious for a legislature
to interfere with the freedom of employer and employee to
make whatever contract they may choose or be forced by
necessity to make.
A word should be said about Mr. Brown's dismissal of
cases sustaining minimum-wage statutes which apply only to
public employment. 15 From the standpoint of the employers
these have no bearing on the imposition of a minimum wage
in private employment. But may they not cause the same
suffering to the less efficient employee? Does not such
raising of wages as resulted from the Adamson Law " have
possibility of loss of employment for individual employees?
Will not the roads curtail expenses as much as possible? If
they cannot economize in rate of wages, will they not seek
economy in the number on the pay-roll? Similar considerations may be urged with respect to legislation requiring expenditures for safety appliances, or increasing costs of production by. abbreviating the hours of labor or eliminating the
employment of children. Whenever a statute makes an
employer expend money he might retain if left free to do as
he chose, it spurs him to greater economy. And such economy
may take the form of curtailing the number of his employees.
The argument that minimum-wage legislation interferes
with sacred rights of employees is of a piece with complaints
that might have been directed against most if not all of. the
labor legislition that has received judicial sanction. Legislative compulsion always interferes with liberty. It usually
imposes pecuniary loss on certain individuals. But such results
do not make the legislation wanting in the requirements of
lue process. unless it cannot reasonably be believed that the
191 U. S. 207. 48 L. Ed. 148, 24 S. C. R.
15 Atkin v. Kansas, (1903)
124. The statute involved in this case fixed the minimum at "the current rate of per diem wages in the locality where the work is performed."
16 Sustained in, Wilson v. New, (1917) 243 U. S. 332, 37 S. C. R. 298.
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statute tends to promote a public welfare which outweighs
any concomitant individual loss.
V
This, then, is the vital issue raised by the statutory minimum wage. What attention does Mr. Brown give to it?
He says that
"such exercise of police-power regulation is based on the
claim that the supplying, to an individual who happens to be
an employee in any occupation, of the needs of such individual
for comfortable living, makes the occupation in question
'affected with a public interest,' and, therefore, subject to the
wage regulation in question."
What he means by saying that the occupation is affected
with a public interest is not clear. The theory of the legislation is that there is a public interest in having those who
give their whole strength to an employer receive enough from
that employer to maintain that strength, that there is a public
interest in having an industry support itself instead of relying
on outside subsidies. Mr. Brown does not say that there is no
such public interest. He says in effect that tle promotion of
such public interest by minimum-wage legislation will cause
loss to individual employers and to individual employees. So
it may. But individual loss results from the promotion of most
if not all public interests. It results from war, from taxation, from discharges in bankruptcy, from exercises of the
police power. The question is whether the public interest is
sufficient to justify the individual loss. The individuals who
suffer loss are part of the public. If they do not share in the
public gain which accompanies their individual loss, they share
in other public gains which depend for their attainment on
the principle that they shall not be defeated by fear of attendant individual loss.
The only specific public interest to which Mr. Brown
adverts is the claim that "the statutory minimum wage is a
protection of the morals of women workers." "This sensational claim," he says, "has been practically abandoned.
Of course if insufficient wages during employment produce
immorality, then lack of employment would tend to produce
it all the more." Yes, if all women now underpaid shall as a
result of the minimum-wage statute lose employment entirely.
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But if the greater part of the women now receiving wages
less than the cost of subsistence are raised to a standard
which will support them, the number of those who must rely
on outside subsidies will be greatly diminished. In so far
then as immorality is fostered by the necessity of adding to
wages some other source of income, the number of those who
are in this predicament will be greatly diminished by the minimum wage. And those who receive no wage at all will form
a special class for whom some special provision must be made.
What is true of the relation of the minimum wage to immorality is true also of the relation of the minimum wage
to ill-health due to insufficient nourishment and improper
living conditions. The purpose and result of minimum-wage
legislation is to ensure that those who give a day's work
receive a day's support in return. The purpose is a public
purpose, because the evils which result from poverty and
weakness and premature death are public evils. 17 They are the
public evils that all our health laws seek to avert. They are
the public evils that ptiblic charity seeks to avert. Men are
compelled to pay money in taxes to prevent those evils. They
must pay to provide food and lodging and medical care for
those who stand in no relation to them except that of fellow
citizens. There can be no dispute that the end sought by
minimum-wage legislation is a legitimate public end. The
only question is the appropriateness of the means.
The objection of the employer is in substance that he is
not his brother's keeper. The statute says that he shall be
his employee's keeper, that he shall not have his employee
kept for him by others. It leaves him free to decide whether
any person shall be his employee. He has a freedom which
is not accorded to those who are taxed to support others who
do not receive from private sources enough to support themselves. But if the employer chooses to take the daily labor
17 Felix Frankfurter in his brief submitted to the Supreme Court in
support of the Oregon minimum-wage statute calls the statute "a rea-

sonable exercise of the state power to minimize danger of unfair or
oppressive contracts." The cases cited in notes 9, 11, 12, and 13, supra.
are instances of the judicial sanction of tfie legislative promotion of
such purpose. So is anti-trust legislation and "blue-sky" legislation.
In minimum-wage legislation, however, this public purpose seems ancillary to the public purpose of preventing the evils referred to in the
text above, since such evils are the inevitable concomitants of such
oppressive contracts.
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of a woman he is compelled to pay that woman enough to
make that labor possible. He pays only the cost of that from
which he chooses to reap the benefits. He pays what the
common law makes men pay in judgments in quasi-contract. 18
The obligation which the law imposes on him in respect to
wages is similar to that which it imposes -on him in respect to
injuries arising in the course of employment. Under our
modern workmen's compensation statutes 29 the employer pays
for injuries to employees, not because his negligence has
caused the injuries, but because the injuries were incident to
the employment and the employer chose to make the contract
that gave rise to the employment. Injuries are only a possible
or likely incident of the employment. The support of the
worker is a necessary and certain incident of the employment.
It is a condition without which the employment cannot exist.
The employer must pay for the fuel for his furnaces, as the
farmer pays for fodder and shelter for his kine. But when
a statute commands an employer to pay enough for clothing,
food and shelter to those whose labor he uses in his factory,
it is alleged to be a violation of the principles of our government. Yet by common law and by many approved statutes
those who accept benefits are made to bear the attendant
burdens.
The only employees who can complain of minimum-wage
legislation are those whom the employer rejects. It must be
recognized that a serious defect in minimum-wage legislation
is the absence of specific provision for caring for the unemployables. But a statute is not invalid because it takes
only the first step in dealing with a situation and leaves other
steps to be adopted as experience shall advise. 20 "Constitutional law, like other mortal contrivances, must take some
18 For a discussion of the extent to which what is really the impo-,
sition of absolute liability for reasons of public policy is attained
-through actions ex contractu and ex delicto, see Jeremiah Smith "Tort
and Absolute Liability-Suggested Changes in Classification," 30 Harvard Law Review 241, 319, 409.
1'Sustained by the Supreme Court in New York Central R. C. v.
White, (1917) 243 U. S.188, 37 S.C. R. 247; Hawkins v. Bleakly, (1917)
243 U. S.210, 37 S.C. R. 255; and Mountain Timber Co. v. Washington. (1917) 243 U. S.219, 37 S.C. R. 260.
20 "But the federal constitution does not require that all state laws
shall be perfect, nor that the entire field of proper legislation shall be
covered by a single 'enactment," Mr. Justice Pitney, in Rosenthal v.
New York, (1912) 226 U. S. 260, 33 S. C. R. 27.
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chances," Mr. Justice Holmes has reminded us.2 1 Minimumwage statutes will tend to sort out the unemployables. They
will remedy the evils due to the fact that industry is not now
maintaining the employees whom it requires and must continue to require. Those whom industry does not require
must be subjected to special treatment later.
This is not, however, all that may be said in answer to the
objection of the employee who loses her chance to work
because her employer will not retain her at the wage prescribed by the statute. She must be regarded not as an isolated individual but as a member of a class. The class of
women workers as a whole will derive such benefits from the
raising of their wages to the cost of subsistence, that the loss
to the unemployables is overbalanced by the gain to thosewhom
industry cannot dispense with. As a compulsory vaccination
statute cannot be defeated because some will suffer from its
enforcement, so a statute raising wages should not be defeated because some laborers will suffer from its enforcement.
The class to which they belong will gain. Therefore there is
no loss to the class to be weighed against the general public
benefits which the statute will promote.
The immateriality of loss to individual employees from the
operation of minimum-wage legislation would seem to be
sufficiently established by the instances already given in which
the courts have sustained legislation establishing standards
of fitness, of rates of interest and of pay. Such loss is regrettable, but it does not make the statute unconstitutional. It is
however to be hoped that the states which adopt minimumwage legislation will soon add provisions for dealing with the
needs of the unemployed and the unemployable. Such needs
are of course provided for in a measure by our systems of
public charity and by institutions for the care and training
of defectives. To the extent to which public funds are released by the effect of minimum-wage statutes on those
who remain in employment, the care of the unemployed will
involve no increase of the tax burden. And to the extent to
which the statutes operate to sift the defectives from the mass
of workers, substantial aid will be given to the movement for
21

Blinn v. Nelson, (1911) 222 U. S.1, at p. 7, 32 S. C. R. 1.
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mental hygiene which has already won recognition as an
essential governmental function.
The economic wisdom or folly of minimum-wage legislation can of course be better demonstrated by experience thdn
by theoretical argument. The judicial determination of such
questions should not be based on fantastic or at best highly
speculative predictions of dire results. And when the results
are known, their appraisal will be in large part dependent upon
views of social policy. Under the development of our constitutional system such questions of policy are passed upon by
the courts. The considerations which influence the judicial
decision of such questions are not always -susceptible of easy
determination. 2 It is apparent, however, that the courts are
rapidly abandoning the general notions of individualism and
of laissez faire which underlie the arguments of the opponents
of minimum-wage legislation. Experience is demonstrating
the superior wisdom of legislative prescription of social standards over the anarchic chaos of unfettered individual action.
Legislation compelling employers to pay a wage equal to
the cost of subsistence differs in detail from other legislation
22 See the discussion of this problem in the article by Mr. Kales
cited in note 7. Mr. Kales suggests the following test for what is a
proper exercise of the police power. "The legislative power is the
legitimate means of correcting mistakes of persistent stupidity and
shortsighted selfishness on the part of the managers. It is the legitimate means of compelling all to do that which the wiser are ready
to do, but the more stupid and the more selfish are unwilling to attempt, and, therefore, not infrequently prevent action by any. The
legislative power is the legitimate means of cutting down the rewards
of successful management so that they are not out of all proportion to
what the successful manager is willing to take." After enumerating
some of the statutes which the Supreme Court has sustained, Mr.
Kales adds: "All these acts in a degree interfere with the managers'
freedom to manage according to their judgment and opportunity. All
in a degree tend to substitute the legislative fiat for the will of the
managers. They tend to sorpe extent to undermine the managers'
chances and motives for successful management. At the same time
they tend to counteract the persistent stupidity and short-sightedness
of the mariagers themselves. They tend to compel all alike to do what
the more enlightened are willing to concede for the best interests of
the business. They tend to compel that co-operation or common action by all the members of a group, which is desirable in the interests
of the business itself as well as the general welfare, but which cannot be obtained without the compulsion of law, hecause some at least
subscribe to the plan voluntarily."
would
In never
applying this test to minimum-wage legislation' it seems moderate to say that any sensible manager of a business would choose to
pay his employees enough to-make them capable of efficient and continuous labor without dependence on other sources of support than
their wages.
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already sustained as constitutional. But the public ends to be
gained by the statutory minimum wage are akin to, if not identical with, the public ends secured by legislation which
has already successfully run the gauntlet of judicial consideration. The private detriment which minimum-wage statutes
may cause is less serious and more easily justified than are
the burdens imposed by statutes which have long been part
of our system of legal regulation. A judicial declaration that
minimum-wage legislation is a deprivation of property without
due process of law would be inconsistent with the necessary
implication of the group of decisions on similar statutes and
with the social philosophy which those decisions exemplify.
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